Overcoming False-Name Bids in Spectrum Auctions and Sharing Bids Equally.

Abstract

In this paper, we extended a ALETHIA concept to overcome the False-name bids, and also we introduced a feature of
sharing the bids among bidders. These sharing of bids is done only, when two bidders bid same amount for a spectrum
during the Auction. The main reason to use ALETHIA concept is that, Existing auction mechanisms are mainly strategyproof to stimulate bidders to reveal their valuations of spectrum truthfully. However, they can suffer significantly from a
new cheating pattern, named false-name bids, where a bidder can manipulate the auction by submitting bids under multiple
fictitious names. We show such false-name bid cheating is easy to make but difficult to detect in dynamic spectrum
auctions. To address this issue, we used ALETHEIA, a novel flexible, false-name-proof auction framework for large-scale
dynamic spectrum access. ALETHEIA not only guarantees strategy-proofness but also resists false-name bids. Moreover,
ALETHEIA enables spectrum reuse across a large number of bidders, to improve spectrum utilization. The sharing of bids
is done during the auction based on the bid price of bidders, if they two bidders bid same price for a spectrum, then the
spectrum is shared equally by the two bidders.